CRIMINAL LAW SAMPLE

Sample 1 PROPERTY OFFENCES:

Question:

John is staying with Sarah for the weekend. Sarah, who works on Saturdays, called John from work on Saturday morning and told him to take £10 from her purse to pay the window cleaner. John had seen a suit in the window of his favourite clothes shop which he really liked. However, he had already spent all of his salary that month. In addition to the £10 for the window cleaner, he took two £50 notes out of her purse, intending to tell Sarah later that he would pay her back from next month’s salary. He also took Sarah’s Oyster travelcard, which had been prepaid to the value of £10.

He returned to the shop and bought the suit, which cost £49. John handed over the two £50 notes and received three £20 notes in exchange. When John realised that he had received too much change, he was delighted and treated

himself to lunch in a restaurant, being careful that no one saw him leave the shop. He left the £10 as a tip for the waitress, who was very pretty. After his lunch, he did not feel like walking home, so he took the bus, using £2.00 from the Oyster travelcard. Just before he got home, he saw some flowers growing on the side of the road outside his neighbour’s garden and picked five to give to Sarah. At home, he did not say anything to Sarah but replaced the Oyster travelcard.

John said later that he didn’t think that she would mind if he took the money and the travelcard as they were sharing a flat.

Discuss John’s liability under the Theft Act 1968.

Answer:

In this case, John’s actions may amount to theft under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968. Theft is defined as the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another, with the intent to permanently deprive that other of it.

By taking money from Sarah’s purse, John has appropriated property that rightfully belongs to her, as per section 3 of the Act, which defines appropriation as assuming the rights of ownership. The money is clearly property under section 4(1), and it belongs to Sarah, making it an appropriation of property.

John might argue that his actions were not dishonest, as he believed Sarah would have consented to him using the money, given that they shared a flat. Section 2(1) of the Theft Act 1968 outlines that a person is not considered dishonest if they believe they have a legal right to the property or that the owner would consent to the appropriation. However, given the substantial amount of money taken, the argument that Sarah would have consented seems weak. John’s belief would likely not align with what most reasonable people would think, as established in R v Ghosh (1982), which requires the defendant to prove that, in their view, their conduct was not dishonest by the standards of reasonable people.

Furthermore, John’s claim that he intended to repay the money does not negate the fact that he intended to treat the money as his own, even temporarily. According to section 6 of the Theft Act 1968, if a person intends to use property as their own, regardless of the owner’s rights, this constitutes an intention to

permanently deprive the owner of it. John’s intention to keep the money until his next paycheck suggests such an intention.

Regarding the Oyster travelcard, John could argue that he merely borrowed it. However, under section 6, borrowing property in such a way that it deprives the owner of it is treated as equivalent to taking it. By using the money on the card, John has deprived Sarah of its value, thus fulfilling the criteria for permanent deprivation as outlined in R v Lloyd (1985).

When John receives excess change at the store, he may argue that the extra money is now his, as it was in his possession. However, under section 5(1) of the Theft Act 1968, if property is received by mistake and the defendant has an obligation to return it, they are under a legal duty to restore it. John’s decision to spend the excess change without attempting to return it demonstrates dishonesty. Moreover, his efforts to ensure no one saw him leave the shop further indicate that his actions were dishonest by the standards of reasonable people, as established in R v Ghosh.

The £10 meant for the window cleaner is also considered property under section 5(3) of the Theft Act 1968. John was under an obligation to use the money for the window cleaner, and his failure to do so—spending it for personal use—could be classified as theft. This is consistent with Davidge v Bunnett (1984), where a defendant was convicted for using money meant for a bill for personal purposes.

Finally, John’s act of picking flowers from the roadside does not amount to theft. Flowers growing wild are not classified as property under section 4(1) unless they are taken for sale or reward. Since John did not take the flowers for sale or reward, they are not considered property for the purposes of the Act.

In conclusion, John’s actions—taking money, using the travelcard, spending excess change, and failing to use the £10 for its intended purpose—amount to dishonesty and the intent to permanently deprive Sarah of her property, making him liable for theft under the Theft Act 1968.

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CONTRACT LAW SAMPLE:

Sample 1 Intention and Consideration:

Abby operates a taxi company and has entered into lucrative contracts with two law firms, City Slackers LLP and Fat Cats LLP. The following events occur

a) Her contract with City Slackers involves the supply of ten taxis every night to take their employees and clients home from the firm’s offices. After a month, Abby realizes that the rise in petrol prices has made it impossible for her to supply the taxis without operating at a loss. She contacts City Slackers and informs them that she will not be able to supply the full quota of ten taxis the following night. City Slackers are hoping to finalise a very profitable deal with important clients that week and have no time to find an alternative taxi firm. In addition, they think that Abby’s professional taxi service will give a good impression and may help to seal the deal. They therefore agree to pay Abby an extra £500 if she can continue to provide the taxis for the rest of the week. Abby agrees but when she invoices City Slackers they refuse to pay her the additional money

b) Abby has an agreement with Fat Cats to supply five taxis every morning. Recently, however, she has had a number of staff problem sand is unable to provide enough drivers for the five taxis. She contacts Fat Cats and asks whether it would be possible to provide only three taxis for two months whilst she expands her business through a new advertising and recruitment drive. Fat Cats agree. Abby spends a huge amount of money on advertising, buys new cars and employs new staff. However, after the two months, Fat Cats now seek compensation for the two taxis that were not provided.

c) One of Abby’s drivers picks up the managing director of Fat Cats, Sophie, every morning. Sophie tells the driver that she loves being driven the longer, scenic route to work since it relaxes her and improves her performance during the working day. The driver begins to take Sophie via the scenic route. After a month, Sophie tells the driver that the journey is greatly benefitting her work and that Fat Cats will pay for the extra petrol. That day, Abby invoices Fat Cats for the last month’s services, including an additional £100 for the extended route. Fat Cats refuse to pay the additional £100.

Advise Abby.

ANSWER:

In order to advise Abby the common law concepts of Consideration and promissory estoppel would be the basis of the recommendation to regarding which contracts between the parties are enforceable. Prima facie, on the face of it the facts suggest that the principles of consideration which are needed to make the contract enforceable in this case are performance of preexisting contractual obligation along with the liberal approach of William v Roffey brother, past consideration and rules of promissory estoppel. Because not every promise is legally enforceable, the English legal system necessitates problem-solving methods to identify which contracts are legally binding and which are not. Doctrine of consideration is the accepted mechanism. As such, the advice given to Abby in this response will be based on the Profit and Detriment analysis proposed by Trietal in the proficient case of Curie v Misa and the Practical Benefit Doctrine developed in the case of William v. Roffey Brothers, which has also watered down the other ideas of Consideration. Each of these scenarios involves Abby and her clients entering into legally binding contracts, so any problems that occur must be examined through the lens of contract law.

The mere fact of agreement alone does not make a contract enforceable. Each side must offer something of value to the other party as “consideration” for entering into the agreement. In order for these promises to be legally binding, both the parties be it Abby or her clients must have provided some form of consideration which can also be referred to as a “badge of enforceability” in legal jargon, for them. Consequently, consideration can be in the form of a service, payment, possession, or undertaking to do or abstain from doing something. In addition to this consideration was perfectly encapsulated by Honourable lush J in the paramount case of Curie v. Misa (1875) who provided the traditional definition of consideration as “Consideration may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party or in some forbearance, loss, detriment, or obligation given, endured, or undertaken by the other party.”

In order to answer the first part of the question, it is necessary to conduct a thorough examination of the principles underlying the idea of the performance of preexisting contractual duty in context of the promise to pay extra. As per the general rule, performance of an existing contractual duty owed to a promisor is no consideration for a fresh promise given by that promisor (Stilk versus Myrick). It is unequivocally important to understand that every new promise must be accompanied by a new consideration. As of the facts Abby and City Slackers have a contract requiring the provision of ten taxis each night to transport staff and customers home from the company’s headquarters. Nevertheless, with petrol prices on the rise, Abby is unable to provide the required number of taxis. She calls City Slackers, explains the issue and gets a promise of £500 more if she can keep providing taxis for the remainder of the week. However, the point of contention arises when the city slackers refused to pay Abby extra 500 pound which they have agreed to pay provided that Abby continue to provide them his services.   It is therefore cardinally important to acknowledge that mere performance of an existing contractual duty can’t amount to sufficient consideration under fresh contractual agreement. The situation, however is different where the defendant goes above his normal responsibilities by making extra efforts such as seen in the case of Hartley v Ponsonby.  Therefore, in such situation promisee is entitled for the additional amount promised by the promiser. However, a more liberal approach was taken in the prime case of William v Roffey Brothers which explains by establishing a new doctrine that a promise to complete work on time or discharge commitments while working extra is sufficient to constitute consideration as by completing the work on time promisee is saving promiser from the hassle and inconvenience which might have occurred otherwise. The defendant derives a practical benefit as a result, provided that there is no duress involved. Similarly, in the given scenario although Abby is not working extra as he was carrying out his normal obligation that were mutually agreed by both parties but as per the liberal approach of William v Roffey Brother he provided non-monetary effort or practical benefit to city slackers. Most importantly, he saved them from inconvenience despite having natural difficulties as he managed to complete his work on time by providing his services to the city slackers. In addition to this, as mentioned above city slackers were in progress of forming a very lucrative contract with key clients that need to closed the subsequent week and therefore had little time to research for the new cab services. They also believe that Abby’s expert taxi service will make a favorable impression and help to close their business dealings. As a result, given the additional £500 in consideration and the parties’ mutual consent, this modification to the original contract is legally binding (both parties agreeing to the new terms). If necessary, Abby can take City Slackers to court to have them pay the additional money they promised to pay.

The following portion of the inquiry requires an in-depth analysis of the legal concepts underlying the concept of promissory estoppel. Central London Property v. High Trees Housing (1947) explains that a lack of legally binding consideration prevents a person from keeping a promise for a set amount of time. The burden of proof rests on the Fat Cats if the following conditions are met before said remedy can be invoked. The key question here is whether there was a valid modification of the contract between the respective parties or not. As a first prerequisite, it is unequivocally important to find out that whether Abby and the Fat Cats were already in a preexisting legal relationship or not. According to Michael Jackson v. Durham Fancy Products, Evenden v Guildford, the parties involved must already have an established contractual connection. Correspondingly, as of the facts Abby and the fat cats have a contract that specifies the supply of five taxis every morning.  The second criterion is whether the fat cats makes a clear and unambiguous promise to Abby or not. As of the facts, Abby is unable to find enough people to work as taxi drivers, so he contacts Fat Cats to see if he can get by with only three cabs for the next two months as he tries to grow her business through advertising and hiring. The Fat Cats are on board with the new plan and subsequently agrees to the new arrangements made by Abby. Therefore, it is pertinent to mention that any commitment made in the name of equity must be crystal clear as highlighted in the case of China Pacific SA v. Food Corp. of India (1980). The next condition which will be investigated is whether or not Abby relied on the fat cats promise due to which he has suffered the loss. The opposite party must have full confidence in the promise as was perfectly encapsulated by the leading case of Kim v Chasewood. Therefore, it is quite evident that Abby agrees with the fat cats, and as a result invests heavily in marketing, new vehicles, and staff but later Fat Cats sued him for damages because they were supposed to be given with two cabs but were not. As a last criterion, it is can be said that fats cat’s behavior or action were unfair (D and C builders v. Rees (1966)). The modification is likely to be enforceable as the parties consented to the new terms and the commitment to offer only three taxis for two months was made in exchange for anything of value (such as the promise to develop the business through promotion and recruitment). Abby may be responsible for breach of contract if there was no consideration or if Fat Cats did not consent to the revised terms. However, provided that, fats cats knew about the financial difficulty Abby was facing as he had spent exorbitant amount of money on expanding his business hence it might be argued that they took an undue advantage of his position. As a result, it would be equitable to stop the fat cats from going back on their promises.

The last part of the question involves the discussion of Past consideration which is considered not a good consideration. As per the general notion if a new promise is clearly different from an existing one, it cannot be enforced by relying on the consideration already provided. This means that any consideration cannot be given before the agreement but must come after it as it was held in the case of Roscorla v Thomas. Parallel to this, in this scenario Fat Cats’ CEO, Sophie, had her driver take the scenic route to work for a month before she agreed to pay for the extra petrol. Therefore, it is impossible to establish the existence of a contract if a consideration was provided prior to the consideration. Sophie’s promise cannot be enforced as a contract but rather can only be regarded as an expression of gratitude because it was made after the consideration had already been provided. The modifications in Lampleigh v. Braithwait (1615) and Pao On Case effectively refuted this line of reasoning where the promise is acting in the light of promisor’s request. Although as per the facts and per the general rule Sophie is not entitled to pay Abby an additional 1000 pound as consideration was made in the past and does not amount to be a good consideration. Abby’s decision to take the scenic way even before the promise of paying extra 1000 pound was made may be interpreted as past consideration.

In conclusion, Abby would claim damages from the city slackers and fat Cats for causing his business distress but is not entitled for the 1000 pound Sophie had promised.

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PROPERTY LAW SAMPLE:

SAMPLE 1 ADVERSE POSSESSION PROBLEM QUESTION;

QUESTION:

Charlotte bought the registered title to a small cottage in May 2004. The house used to be the gatekeeper’s lodge for a country property, Barnwell House. As the cottage did not have its own garden, Charlotte agreed with her neighbor, Anne, to make use of a neglected secret garden at the rear of Branwell House. Anne is the registered proprietor of Branwell House. Charlotte used the secret garden to grow vegetables. When Charlotte’s licence of the secret garden expired in December 2011, Anne was not prepared to renew it because she had plans to replace the garden with a maze. Shortly afterwards Anne, who was not in the best of health, boarded up Branwell House and moved to live in her cottage in Yorkshire. In Anne’s absence, Charlotte continued to use the secret garden to grow vegetables. To deter the birds, she installed a sonic device to scare them and erected a Perspex roof to protect the soft fruit. In March 2021 Anne sold Branwell House to Emily. A few weeks after she moved in, Emily discovered that Charlotte was using the secret garden to grow vegetables. Emily has written to Charlotte insisting she vacate the garden immediately. A few days later, Charlotte received a letter from the legal department of Wuthering Council. The letter instructed Charlotte to remove the picket fence at the front of her cottage so that Wuthering Council can make use of the land inside the fence to build a pavement. It claimed that a previous owner of the cottage must have wrongly enclosed the strip of land, which Wuthering Council’s plans show rightly belongs to it. Advise Charlotte

ANSWER:

Adverse possession is a legal doctrine that allows an individual to claim ownership of land after occupying it for a specific period, provided certain conditions are met. This principle is grounded in common law and has been codified in various statutes, including the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925), the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980), and the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002). This essay will explore whether Charlotte (C) can claim ownership of the secret garden that belongs to Anne (A) and the picket fence at the front of her cottage, which belongs to Wuthering Council (WC), under the principles of adverse possession. In doing so, it will assess Charlotte’s factual possession, intention to possess, and the statutory time periods for adverse possession in light of relevant case law and statutory frameworks.

Adverse possession allows a person who is not the legal owner of land to acquire ownership rights over it, provided they meet three fundamental conditions: (1) factual possession, (2) intention to possess, and (3) the statutory time period. These conditions are well-established in common law, particularly in landmark cases such as Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran and Pye v. Graham. To successfully claim adverse possession, the claimant must prove they have controlled the land in question, intended to treat it as their own, and occupied it for a statutory period without the consent of the rightful owner.

In the context of Charlotte’s claim to the secret garden and the picket fence, it is essential to evaluate whether she has met these requirements, particularly in light of the LRA 2002, which governs adverse possession claims regarding registered land.

The secret garden is registered freehold land owned by Anne. Under the LRA 2002, land that is registered is subject to specific rules regarding adverse possession. The first critical factor to consider is whether Charlotte’s occupation of the secret garden began with permission from Anne. As per the facts, Charlotte was granted a license to use the garden by Anne, which lasted until December 2011. According to the case of Colin Dawson v. Howard and Allen v. Matthews, the law stipulates that adverse possession cannot be claimed during a period of permission. Permission granted by the landowner precludes a claim for adverse possession, meaning Charlotte’s possession could not be considered adverse until the permission expired in December 2011.

Once Charlotte’s license expired in December 2011, she could begin to establish adverse possession. In Powell v. McFarlane (1970), the court defined factual possession as an appropriate degree of physical control over the land. This means that the claimant must treat the land in a manner consistent with ownership and exercise exclusive control, without interference from the legal owner or the public. In Charlotte’s case, her use of the secret garden to grow vegetables, install a sonic device to deter birds, and erect a Perspex roof to protect the soft fruit suggests significant control over the land. Such actions go beyond mere use; they show a clear intention to take ownership and alter the land to suit Charlotte’s needs, indicating factual possession. This mirrors the reasoning in Dyer v. Terry, where cultivation was considered sufficient to establish factual possession.

The second requirement for adverse possession is the intention to possess the land, known as animus possidendi. As established in Buckinghamshire CC v. Moran and Pye v. Graham, intention to possess can be inferred from actions demonstrating that the claimant is treating the land as their own and excluding others from it. Charlotte’s continued use of the garden, coupled with her installation of protective structures and her failure to seek further permission from Anne after December 2011, strongly suggests that she intended to possess the land. In Powell v. McFarlane, it was held that the intention to possess is established when the claimant acts as an owner, and Charlotte’s actions are in line with this principle.

Under Schedule 6 of the LRA 2002, a claimant must have possessed the land for at least 10 years before applying for registration as the owner. Since Charlotte’s license expired in December 2011, the period for adverse possession began at that time. If Charlotte has occupied the garden continuously and exclusively from December 2011 to December 2021, she would have satisfied the 10-year requirement for adverse possession. Following this period, Charlotte would be entitled to apply for registration as the new proprietor of the secret garden.

The picket fence, located at the front of Charlotte’s cottage, belongs to Wuthering Council (WC). Charlotte’s claim to the picket fence also hinges on the principles of adverse possession. For Charlotte to claim the land on which the fence stands, she must demonstrate that the land is adjacent to her property, and that she has exercised control over it for a continuous period of 10 years.

The fence itself is a key piece of evidence for factual possession. If Charlotte has maintained the fence for over 10 years and has reasonably believed it to be part of her property, this could serve as evidence of her intention to possess the land. In IAM Group v. Chaudhary and Davis v. Johns, the courts have held that a reasonable belief regarding land boundaries can establish adverse possession, provided the claimant has maintained and used the land in question for a significant period. Charlotte’s maintenance of the fence, coupled with her long-term occupation of the area, suggests that she believed it to be part of her property, further supporting her claim to factual possession.

As the fence has been in place since May 2004, Charlotte’s possession period exceeds the 10-year requirement under Schedule 6 of the LRA 2002. Given the adjacent nature of the land, Charlotte may be eligible to apply for registration as the new owner of the land on which the fence sits. If she can demonstrate continuous possession and control for a period of 10 years, her claim for adverse possession could be successful.

Wuthering Council may object to Charlotte’s claim for adverse possession, particularly if it can prove one of the exceptions under Schedule 6, Para 5 of the LRA 2002. If WC chooses to object, they must do so within 65 days of receiving the registrar’s notification. The registrar will then determine whether Charlotte meets the criteria for adverse possession. If WC fails to respond or fails to establish a valid objection, Charlotte’s application for registration will proceed. However, WC may challenge the claim by proving that one of the three exceptions in Para 5 applies, thereby preventing Charlotte from gaining ownership.

In conclusion, Charlotte may have a valid claim to the secret garden and the picket fence under the principles of adverse possession. For the secret garden, her continuous use of the land after December 2011, including the installation of protective measures and cultivation of vegetables, supports her claim for factual possession and intention to possess. Given that the statutory period for adverse possession began in December 2011, Charlotte is likely to meet the 10-year requirement by December 2021 and can apply for registration as the new proprietor under Schedule 6 of the LRA 2002.

Similarly, for the picket fence, Charlotte’s maintenance of the fence and her reasonable belief that the land was part of her property strengthen her claim for adverse possession. Since she has maintained the fence for over 10 years, Charlotte may also be eligible to apply for registration as the owner of the land on which the fence stands.

However, Charlotte must be prepared for potential objections from Wuthering Council, who may challenge her claim. If WC objects, Charlotte will need to address these objections through the appropriate legal procedures. Nonetheless, if Charlotte successfully meets the criteria for adverse possession, she could ultimately be registered as the owner of both the secret garden and the land under the picket fence.

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TORT LAW SAMPLE:

SAMPLE 2 PROBLEM QUESTION ON NUISANCE:

QUESTION:

Eco Ltd has been manufacturing furniture in its factory on the industrial estate outskirts of Westport village for over thirty years. The factory operates on a 24-hour basis and accepts deliveries of timber throughout the day and the night. Two years ago Mr and Mrs Jones moved into Westport House, the only residence in close proximity to the estate. Mrs Jones needs a quiet environment for the daily yoga classes she runs from her home but she had to cancel her classes because of the noise from the factory. The noise from the machines during the night keeps Mr and Mrs Jones awake. Medical evidence shows that Mr Jones’ increased asthma attacks are due to invisible particles in the sawdust emanating from Eco’s factory. The invisible particles have also caused damage to the exotic shrubs that Mr Jones planted in his garden. The large trucks coming through Westport village to deliver consignments of timber to Eco throughout the night cause a loss of sleep to the villagers of Westport. Westport Lodge Hotel guests are increasingly posting negative comments on social media about the noise at night. The negative publicity has led to large scale booking cancellations and the hotel is now being forced to close. Eco decided to extend its factory to meet the increased demand for its furniture. A power blasting operation was required to cut through some underground rock to dig the foundations. Eco appointed a power blasting expert to oversee the operation but unexpectedly an explosion occurred during the process. The stones from the blast smashed windows in the Jones’ house. Another stone hit Olga, a cyclist passing on the road outside the factory, causing her an eye injury. In respect of the above incidents discuss the liability of Eco, if any, in the tort of nuisance and/or Rylands v Fletcher.

ANSWER:

In examining the scenario involving Eco Ltd and the potential tortious claims arising from their actions, we must first address how their activities might give rise to a private nuisance and potentially a claim under Rylands v Fletcher. The Jones’ claims of yoga class cancellations, restless nights, asthma issues, and damage to exotic shrubs from sawdust may indeed amount to a private nuisance. The test of “reasonable user” is essential in evaluating these claims, considering key factors such as locality, the duration and frequency of the issues, and any resulting property damage.

The nuisance in question appears to stem from the operations of Eco Ltd, particularly the movement of large trucks and the escaping sawdust. These disturbances have affected the Joneses both personally and in relation to their property. Private nuisance, as described by Gouldkamp J. and Jolowicz, concerns the unjustifiable interference with an individual’s enjoyment of their land or specific associated rights. As the most appropriate claim here, private nuisance addresses the unlawful interference with the Joneses’ comfort, demonstrated by their sleepless nights, Mrs. Jones’ inability to teach yoga, and the damage caused to their exotic shrubs due to sawdust escaping from the factory. According to Hunter v Canary Wharf (1997), a claimant must have locus standi and a proprietary interest to pursue a nuisance claim. This means that only individuals who have a proprietary interest in the affected land can seek relief. The Joneses, being property owners, have the necessary standing to bring this claim.

Next, it is necessary to determine whether Eco Ltd. can be held liable for the disturbance. Under Cambridge Water Co v. Eastern Counties Leather, a defendant can be sued for all reasonably anticipated losses resulting from their actions. Given that all of the disturbances emanate from Eco Ltd’s property, they will be considered as a single economic unit or party. In Sedleigh Denfeild, it was held that an occupier may be liable if they have adopted, continued, or should have reasonably known about the nuisance but failed to take appropriate action to mitigate it. Thus, despite the actions of industrial workers, the factory’s operations—within its authorized patterns—remain the responsibility of Eco Ltd.

Regarding whether the conduct of Eco Ltd. constitutes an actionable private nuisance, the test of “reasonable user” is critical. If a defendant utilizes their land in a way that conforms to accepted reasonable standards, they will not be held liable. The case of Rapier v. London Tramways Co. establishes that the consequences of the defendant’s actions are what matters, not the precautions taken. Determining the “reasonable use” of land requires a multi-faceted approach.

First, as noted in Sturges v. Bridgman, nuisance will be judged according to the locality in which it occurs. Since Eco Ltd’s operations are situated on the outskirts of a village near residential properties, and there is no indication that the site is far from residential areas, the “locality” factor would likely favor the Joneses. Additionally, as per Rushmer v. Polsue, even in industrial areas, certain standards must be maintained. Therefore, activities such as working late at night, making loud noises at odd hours, or allowing the escape of invisible particles may be considered unreasonable and actionable nuisances, regardless of the location.

Another important factor is the duration and frequency of the nuisance. In De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, the court recognized that higher frequency and longer duration of a nuisance increase the likelihood of it being actionable. In this case, it is clear that the disturbance was frequent, as it caused the Joneses both restless nights and Mrs. Jones to repeatedly cancel her yoga classes. Therefore, Eco Ltd’s activities can be regarded as unreasonably affecting the Joneses.

In instances where property damage occurs, the issue of discomfort becomes secondary. If personal discomfort or property damage is caused, the court is more likely to find a nuisance. The increasing frequency of Mrs. Jones’ asthma attacks, a direct consequence of the pollution from the factory, indicates substantial personal discomfort (Selfe v. Walter). Furthermore, as shown in St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping, the defendant will be held liable if the interference results in material harm to the claimant’s land or property, as seen in the damage to the Joneses’ exotic shrubs caused by sawdust. Consequently, the interference with their property here would likely support a claim for private nuisance.

Thus, applying the “reasonable user” test, Eco Ltd.’s activities clearly amount to an actionable nuisance. Though Eco Ltd. has been operating for 30 years, as established in Sturges v. Bridgman, time begins to run when the claimant becomes aware of the nuisance. Since the Joneses moved into the property only two years ago and did not experience the disturbances for the previous 20 years, the relevant time frame for the nuisance claim begins from the moment they became aware of the disruption.

In terms of remedies, the court may grant an injunction. An injunction is a flexible remedy, as outlined in Tetley v. Chitty, and it can include restrictions on the defendant’s activities, such as limiting the hours during which Eco Ltd. may operate or requiring the factory to install filtration systems to mitigate the harmful effects of sawdust. The court will likely limit Eco Ltd.’s operations to prevent undue discomfort for the Joneses.

However, under the Shelfer rule, as set out in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., damages may be awarded in lieu of an injunction in cases where the claimant has suffered minimal harm, where the compensation can be easily estimated monetarily, or where an injunction would cause undue hardship to the defendant. The court will assess whether granting damages for the property damage to the exotic shrubs would be an adequate remedy. It should be noted that damages will only cover non-physical disruptions to the land, and not personal harm, such as Mrs. Jones’ asthma attacks, in accordance with Hunter v. Canary Wharf.

The next issue to address is whether the West Port Lodge Hotel can file a public nuisance lawsuit against Eco Ltd. for its forced closure and large-scale booking cancellations. Public nuisance law provides protection for the public at large. It is both unlawful (criminal) and illegal (tort) to cause a public nuisance. In Attorney General v. PYA Quarries Ltd., Romer J. stated that a disruption affecting the public and causing special damage to the claimant is necessary to establish a public nuisance. In this case, the excessive number of trucks entering West Port Lodge at night has disrupted the quality of life in the village. The hotel has sustained special damages beyond the harm experienced by other villagers. The lodge’s entire operation was impacted by the disturbance, resulting in a loss of reputation and, consequently, the cancellation of large bookings. This shows the substantial and immediate damage caused to the hotel, as reflected in the ruling in Benjamin v. Storr. Therefore, it is likely that West Port Lodge has a valid claim for public nuisance.

Lastly, with regard to whether the injuries suffered by Mr. and Mrs. Jones may be recoverable under the nuisance laws established in Rylands v. Fletcher, the four elements laid out by Blackburn J. in the case must be considered. To succeed in a Rylands v. Fletcher claim, the claimant must demonstrate that the defendant brought something dangerous onto their land, that it escaped, and that the escape caused foreseeable harm. In this case, Eco Ltd’s blasting operation likely constitutes the “non-natural use” of land, as it involved dangerous practices, such as blasting underground rock to dig a foundation. The stones that escaped from the factory grounds were dangerous and caused damage to the Joneses’ property. The escape of stones from Eco Ltd.’s premises, which struck Mrs. Jones while cycling and caused damage to Mr. Jones’ window, satisfies the requirement for an “escape.”

Furthermore, Eco Ltd.’s use of land in a non-natural way is demonstrated by the blasting operations, which go beyond typical land use. As confirmed in Read v. Lyons and Transco v. Stockport MBC, the use of land for blasting operations was extraordinary and abnormal. It was also foreseeable that the stones would escape from Eco Ltd.’s land and cause harm, fulfilling the foreseeability requirement under Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather.

Finally, the defense of a third-party act cannot be invoked in this case, as the contractors involved were not strangers to Eco Ltd., and shared liability may be imposed, even in cases where negligence by a third party is involved, as shown in Bobb v Jobb. Eco Ltd. retains responsibility for the actions of its contractors due to its supervisory role. Therefore, Eco Ltd. is likely to be held liable for the damage caused under both the principles of private nuisance and Rylands v. Fletcher.

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EUROPEAN UNION LAW SAMPLE:

SAMPLE 2 PROBLEM ON COMPETITION POLICY:

Strong Steel and Steel United are two European steel producing companies. There are eight steel producers in Europe. In terms of market share in Europe; Strong Steel has 41% and Steel United, has 30%. In order to increase its sales in Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic, Strong Steel offers a very attractive discounted price to new customers in these countries of 120 Euros per ton.

Some managers at Strong Steel have been participating in meetings with Steel United in order to discuss a marketing strategy to survive the economic crisis. One of the meetings was attended by several other important European steel producers and all those present at the meeting agreed to increase the price of steel by 0.5% Strong Steel has increased the price accordingly starting this month.

You are employed by Strong Steel to advise them whether offering discounts in Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic is compatible with EU competition law. Strong Steel also wonders whether the decision to increase the price by 0.5% could contravene EU competition law.

ANSWER:

We must evaluate the validity of the policies implemented by SS in relation to the EU’s competition policy based on the given fact pattern. To facilitate attractive discounts for new consumers, reliance on Article 102 TFEU is essential. Specifically, after identifying the relevant product market and the companies’ market share, we may consider the potential for abuse of selective pricing. In light of the decision to raise prices by 0.5 percent, we will be focusing on Article 101 TFEU, which allows us to assess the likelihood of informal horizontal agreement, concerted practice, and oligopoly defence. It is irrelevant if discounts or price increases are implemented, as CP is predicated on actual or potential effects (INTENT or EFFECT).

The primary issue is whether SS constitutes a dominant entity in the manufacturing industry of steel and whether the policy adopted by strong steel of offering attractive discount rates to new customers in Poland, Romania and Czech republic be upheld as a breach of ART 102. Article 102 TFEU stipulates that “any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or significant parts thereof shall be prohibited if it may impact trade between member states.” Consequently, it comprises four fundamental components: identification of the relevant market, identification of the dominant enterprise, determination of abuse, and assessment of its impact on intra-union trade.

The primary issue is TH’s dominance in the steel manufacturing product market. In the United Brands v. Commissions case, a position of dominance within the market was articulated which states that the market encompassing the goods or services involved in a merger or acquisition, along with those considered identical by consumers based on price, intended use, and characteristics, is evaluated to ascertain the company’s dominance within the relevant product market. According to UBC v. Commission, a relevant product market is made up of goods that are comparable to one another in terms of features, costs, or intended applications. It could also be assessed based on “cross-elasticity of supply,” or the degree to which suppliers of a purportedly substitute product can readily shift to supplying the product under consideration (Michelin).

An area where enterprises can operate in the supply and demand for their products and services, where the degree of competition is reasonable enough, and where it is simple to set oneself apart from neighboring areas due to distinctly different competitive conditions is considered a relevant geographic market. In the case of United Brands, it was determined that the geographical market is a domain in which all TRADERS have identical objective circumstances of competition. The product’s geographic market is predominantly regional as it is confined to the European Union, with manufacturing occurring in different 8 other member states of Europe.

In UBC v. Commission, a company is considered to possess a dominant position if its economic power allows it to function predominantly “independently of its competitors, customers, and even consumers.” Establishing a company’s dominance primarily comes from its share of the relevant market. The ECJ ruled in Akzo v. Commission that a business holding 50% or more of the shares is typically referred to as “dominant.” It’s not the only deciding element, either. Hoffmann La Roche stipulates that corporations should have held their shares for a significant amount of time. This argument can be further summarized by looking at the British Airways v. Commission case, in which British Airways was found to be dominant in the air travel agency market with a 39.7 percent, while the other company had a 5% share. As a result, SS is the market leader within the steel market of EU as having 41% share , while the market share gap between it and the next competitor SU with 31% MS, is high thus highlighting its dominance.

What is crucial is not whether SS is found to be in a dominant position but whether they have abused that position. An abuse, as per Hoffmann La Roche, constitutes any such activity that has the “effect of hindering the maintenance of degree of already existing competition or preventing growth of competition”. Therefore, it covers both exploitative and anti-competitive abuses (MICHELIN). In a specific scenario, SS aims to providing advantageous discounts to its new customers therefore representing the possibility of selective pricing abuse. Selective pricing, emphasizes the need for a uniform price for all products, therefore different customer categories shouldn’t pay various prices. The issue in SS is similar to that in the Irish Sugar v. Commission case, wherein it was concluded that abuse had occurred because Irish Sugar had provided discounted prices to its competitors’ customers than to their existing customers. Therefore, it is pertinent for SS to understand that in order for their expansion in these countries they should refrain from such strategy because of its anti-competitive nature as being a dominant undertaking it is trying to outflank the competition, which ultimately would be caught by 102. However, it is pertinent to mention that “volume discounts/bulk discounts” which occur as one-time events, are considered valid as they uphold “competition on the merit.”

Whether secret meetings between the managers of SS and SU with the effect of increasing price by 0.5% be regarded as a breach of competition policy within the ambit of ART 101 TFEU. Firstly, it must be established whether or not there is an agreement between undertakings in relation to the sale of steel and whether, if there is such an agreement, it amounts to a distortion of competition within the internal market. Undertakings agreements that “affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market” are null and invalid under Article101(1)TFEU. In the well-publicized HOFNER case, the term “undertaking” was defined to include any entity engaging in economic activity, notwithstanding its legal status or funding mechanism.  Therefore, SS and SU are the undertakings in this scenario since they are an entity engaged in economic and commercial activity by manufacturing steel for sale in the market. Subsequently, it is imperative to examine if the companies that were identified exhibited conduct that may be subject to scrutiny under Article 101 rules. As exemplified so well in the ACF CHEMIEFARMS case, agreements might take many forms: formal, informal, written, oral, gentlemen’s promises, vertical, or horizontal. Since both of them are manufacturers, we may say that the agreement between the undertakings is horizontal. Furthermore, as their decision of reducing the price of steel by 0.5% was made through informal dealings, it can also be inferred that the argument of informal meeting in accordance with the concerted practice can be raised.

When undertakings behave in a comparable anti-competitive manner without any agreement is known as concerted practice. In the case of ICI v. Commission, this was defined as an arrangement wherein two or more undertakings intentionally substitute practical collaboration for the perils of competition, even though they have not yet reached the stage where an agreement has been legitimately established. In addition, the sugar cartel case established that there was no need to provide evidence of an “actual plan” to stifle competition. As a result, meetings between the undertaking on an attempt to reduce prices can be held as concerted practices as price control is unequivocally the domain of authorities. However, CP can be struck down on the basis if the parallel conduct of the undertakings is benefiting the society as a whole which is clearly not the case here.

The next point of contention is whether this concerted practice be justified under the heading of oligopoly. An oligopoly is a market structure that includes a restricted number of firms, significant barriers to entry, and interdependent companies. As perfectly encapsulated by Richard Wish when one company initiates a move, the other company has little choice but to respond similarly, or it risks being eliminated from the market. Even where there were 11 undertakings, it was determined in the ICI v. Commission decision that concerted practice and simultaneous price increases were not a rational market structure. However, in the wood pulp oligopoly defense of “PRICE FOLLOWING” was deemed acceptable provided a legitimate rationale existed for a company’s actions. SS may contend that because there are only eight makers in the steel industry, it may be necessary for it to follow its rivals in order to remain competitive. The oligopoly defense, however, is debatable because, in contrast to the smaller companies that might have arguments for being driven out of the market, SS, a dominating company, shouldn’t have participated in these meetings of parallel conduct. Furthermore, there is no indication of any economic difficulties that SS could have to deal with; they are, after all, solely the purview of the authorities.

The Commission and the authorities will implement a two-stage approach, as described in the Metropol v. Commission case, should a case concerning Strong Steel arise under Articles 101 and 102. The second stage will involve the ECJ’s rule of reason approach. The NCA must apply EU competition law and raise the 101(3) defence if it is concluded that Strong Steel and Steel United have breached Article 101. Nevertheless, EU regulations are protected as taking precedence over conflicting national laws.

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FAMILY LAW SAMPLE:

SAMPLE 1 FINANCIAL PROVISION WITHIN MARRIAGE:

Question:

Sarah and Thomas have been married for 10 years, and Thomas has two children, Alex and Samuel, from his previous marriage to Julia, who passed away giving birth to Samuel. Thomas has sent his two children to private schools, and the fees are partially covered by a school fees plan that Thomas subscribed to when the children were born, with the remainder paid from Thomas’s income, which is substantial and currently around £60,000 annually.

Sarah and Thomas encountered marital difficulties and separated four years ago. Both are opposed to divorce for religious reasons but have accepted living apart. Upon separating, Thomas used all of his savings, including an inheritance, to pay £100,000 towards a luxury apartment for Sarah. The remaining £25,000 was raised via a mortgage, for which Sarah was responsible. Thomas remained in their former marital home, which is valued at £300,000, with an outstanding mortgage of £20,000. The two children use this house as their home when not at school, though they maintain a good relationship with Sarah and visit her occasionally.

Sarah earns £10,000 working part-time at a florist shop. She is seeking more financial stability, as she has been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and will not be able to increase her earnings. She has no savings to rely on, and at 50, she fears an uncertain financial future. Thomas, however, refuses to consider providing her with any further financial support, believing he has already been more than generous in the past.

Advise Sarah on her prospects of obtaining financial support from Thomas if there is no divorce.

Answer:

Sarah and Thomas are separated but not divorced, and as such, Sarah’s entitlement to financial support is governed by either the Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates’ Courts) Act 1978 (DP (MC) A 1978) or the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). These Acts apply to separated spouses, and the focus here will be on the financial provisions available under these laws.

Sarah could seek financial provision through the Magistrates’ Court under the Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates’ Courts) Act 1978 (DP (MC) A 1978). The court may consider a section 2, section 6, or section 7 order. Applications to the Magistrates’ Court are typically quicker and more affordable than those to the County Court, but the Magistrates’ powers are more limited.

A section 2 order can only be made if Sarah satisfies one of the section 1 grounds. The key ground would be whether Thomas has failed to provide “reasonable maintenance” for Sarah and/or the children of the family. Whether Thomas has failed to provide reasonable maintenance would be determined by the court by comparing the level of financial support Thomas has provided with what the court would typically order. If Thomas’s current provision falls short of what is deemed reasonable, the court will find a failure to provide maintenance, even if Thomas believes he has been generous (Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates’ Courts) Act 1978) [1].

The court will apply the section 3 factors when assessing the situation, which are similar to the considerations under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). These factors include the financial resources, income, and needs of both parties. Thomas, earning £60,000 per year and having substantial assets, is in a much stronger financial position than Sarah, who earns £10,000 annually and has a reduced earning capacity due to her illness. The court will also look at both parties’ contributions to the welfare of the family, including Thomas’s financial contributions (such as providing Sarah with a luxury flat) and Sarah’s role in caring for the children and maintaining relationships with them (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973) [2].

The section 3 factors will also take into account Sarah’s multiple sclerosis, as this illness affects her ability to work and her future financial stability. As highlighted in the case of B v B (1982), Sarah’s health condition could justify a higher level of financial support from Thomas. The court will also assess whether Sarah’s expenses are likely to increase as her illness worsens (B v B (1982)) [3]. Section 3(2)(f) considers the parties’ contributions to the welfare of the family, and in this case, both Sarah and Thomas have made significant contributions—Thomas through his financial support and Sarah through her caregiving and maintaining family relationships.

Given Sarah’s health and the insufficient financial support from Thomas, it is likely that the court will determine that Thomas has failed to provide reasonable maintenance. This could result in the court ordering substantial periodical payments for Sarah, which could be adjusted as her condition worsens. The Magistrates’ Court can also award a lump sum up to £1,000 under section 2 of the Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates’ Courts) Act 1978, which may be helpful for Sarah’s immediate expenses. However, this order would end if Sarah and Thomas cohabit for six months, as per section 25(1) of the same Act (Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates’ Courts) Act 1978) [1].

This case is not suitable for a section 7 order, as there have been no previous maintenance payments by Thomas to Sarah during the separation. If Thomas and Sarah can reach an agreement on financial support, this can be formalized through a section 6 order. If they are unable to agree, a section 7 order might be considered, although this seems unlikely in this case.

Sarah may also seek support through the County Court under section 27 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), which deals with the failure to provide reasonable maintenance. The criteria are similar to those in the Magistrates’ Court, but the County Court has broader powers, including the ability to order secured or unsecured periodical payments. This could be beneficial for Sarah, as it would provide more security, especially if Thomas’s financial resources are sufficient to make larger provision (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973) [2].

The County Court has more flexibility, including the possibility of securing payments, which could continue even in the event of Thomas’s death. This would provide Sarah with more financial stability compared to a Magistrates’ Court order. Additionally, unlike in the Magistrates’ Court, cohabitation does not automatically terminate a County Court order, although it may be considered in future variations of maintenance payments under section 31 MCA 1973 (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973) [2].

Given Thomas’s wealth, he may be expected to contribute more to Sarah’s financial wellbeing, particularly since she has maintained a good relationship with his children, who continue to visit her. The court will also consider the length of the marriage and Sarah’s age (50), as she is unlikely to significantly increase her earnings due to her illness. The court is unlikely to classify the marriage as short, especially considering Sarah’s ongoing involvement in the children’s lives, which makes it reasonable to expect Thomas to provide financial support (Wachtel v Wachtel (1973)) [4].

If Thomas’s assets allow, the County Court could offer a more substantial and secure financial provision than the Magistrates’ Court. This could include a larger lump sum or secured periodical payments, and cohabitation would not automatically terminate such orders.

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SAMPLE 2 Question:

Jerry is in a relationship with Mariana. One day, Mariana tells Jerry she is leaving him for Robinson, who is the best lover she has ever had. Jerry is diagnosed with depression. That evening, Jerry angrily throws a burning paraffin-soaked rag through Robinson’s open window. He does not check whether anyone is inside. The fire spreads rapidly, trapping Emma, Robinson’s little sister, on the top floor. Mike, a neighbor, hears Emma’s screams but does nothing. Eventually, the fire brigade arrives. Fireman Dave discovers that he has forgotten to bring a tall enough ladder. Emma jumps from an upper window into the arms of the crowd gathering below. She suffers severe injuries. In hospital, Dr. Andrew gives Emma a blood transfusion of the wrong blood-type. She dies a week later. In his statement to the police, Jerry said that he thought it possible that someone would be injured but he had not wanted anyone to die. His aim was to frighten Robinson into leaving Mariana alone.

Answer:

Jerry is in a relationship with Mariana. One day, Mariana tells Jerry that she is leaving him for Robinson, who she claims is the best lover she has ever had. Jerry, feeling depressed, becomes very angry. That evening, in his anger, he throws a burning paraffin-soaked rag through Robinson’s open window without checking if anyone is inside. The fire spreads quickly and traps Emma, Robinson’s younger sister, on the top floor of the house. A neighbor, Sam, hears Emma’s screams but does nothing. Eventually, the fire brigade arrives, but Fireman Jack realizes that he forgot to bring a tall enough ladder. Emma, in fear, jumps from a high window into the crowd below and suffers serious injuries. While in the hospital, Emma is given a blood transfusion with the wrong blood type, which ultimately causes her death a week later.

In his statement to the police, Jerry says that he didn’t want anyone to die, only to frighten Robinson into leaving Mariana alone. He admits that although he thought it was possible someone could get hurt, he didn’t intend to cause anyone’s death.

Jerry’s actions raise the question of whether he is guilty of murder or manslaughter. Murder is the unlawful killing of a person with malice aforethought, either an intention to kill or cause serious bodily harm. For Jerry to be found guilty of murder, the court needs to determine whether his actions directly caused Emma’s death and whether he had the intention or recklessness required for murder. Jerry’s throwing of the burning rag clearly started the chain of events that led to Emma’s death. However, the court must also consider whether other actions contributed to her death, such as Sam’s failure to act or Fireman Jack’s mistake in not bringing a tall enough ladder. These actions don’t break the chain of causation, as they did not directly prevent the initial cause (Jerry’s actions). Additionally, Dr. Andrew’s mistake in giving the wrong blood type does not sever the chain of causation, as Jerry’s actions were still the substantial cause of Emma receiving medical treatment in the first place.

Jerry states that he did not intend to kill anyone. This is where the concept of oblique intention comes into play. According to the law, oblique intention means that even if someone does not directly intend to cause death or injury, they can still be guilty of murder if the result was virtually certain to happen and they foresaw this possibility. In this case, Jerry probably did not intend to kill anyone, but the act of throwing a burning rag through an open window means that it was likely that someone would be seriously hurt. However, it is not clear whether Jerry knew that death was virtually certain to occur. If he is found to be reckless, then he may be found guilty of reckless manslaughter or manslaughter by an unlawful or dangerous act.

The law will also consider Jerry’s mental state or mens rea to determine his level of guilt. If Jerry is found guilty of murder, then he could argue partial defenses to reduce his liability. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides partial defenses, such as loss of control and diminished responsibility.

To start with, Jerry could argue that he acted out of loss of control, a defense that reduces murder to manslaughter. For this defense to succeed, Jerry would need to show that something said or done to him caused him to lose control. In this case, Mariana’s comment that Robinson is the best lover she’s ever had could be a significant trigger for his anger. However, the law specifically excludes sexual infidelity as a valid reason for a loss of control defense. But in a case like R v Clinton, the court ruled that while sexual infidelity alone cannot justify a loss of control, it can be part of the context to assess whether Jerry’s reaction was reasonable. If the jury believes that Jerry’s anger was triggered by Mariana’s words, they would then assess whether a reasonable person, in his position, would have acted the same way. The jury would also consider that Jerry was depressed, but his depression will not be taken into account unless it explains why he lost control. If they find that Jerry acted in a way that a reasonable person might, his charge could be reduced to manslaughter.

Alternatively, Jerry could plead diminished responsibility, claiming that his depression impaired his ability to control his actions. To succeed in this defense, Jerry would need to prove that at the time of the incident, he was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning caused by his depression. Expert medical evidence would need to support the claim that Jerry’s mental state significantly impaired his understanding of what he was doing or his ability to control his actions. If Jerry can show that his depression played a substantial role in his behavior, then the jury might find that Jerry acted with diminished responsibility. This would likely reduce his liability from murder to manslaughter.

In conclusion, while Jerry may not have intended to kill Emma, his reckless actions clearly contributed to her death. If found guilty of murder, Jerry could use the defenses of loss of control or diminished responsibility to reduce his charge to manslaughter. The jury will need to decide if Jerry acted recklessly, if he lost control due to provocation, or if his depression significantly impaired his self-control. These defenses, if successful, would lower his liability from murder to manslaughter, depending on the evidence presented.

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